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UN-NEIGHBORLY CONDUCT: WHY CAN'T VIRGiNIA BEACH
AND NORTH CAROLINA BE FRIENDS?
PAUL SCHMIDT*
In 1997, the federal court system granted final approval for the
Lake Gaston Pipeline, thereby paving the way for Virginia Beach,
Virginia, to begin taking water from Lake Gaston for use in Southside
Hampton Roads.' Virginia Beach is located in the extreme southeastern
comer of Virginia, where the Atlantic Ocean meets the Chesapeake Bay.
Lake Gaston sits astride the North Carolina-Virginia State Line, some one
hundred miles inland. This court decision was the culmination of a long
and drawn-out battle that had been raging since 1983, and will not likely
conclude until long after the turn of the millenium. Controversy always
seems to surround inter-basin transfers of water, even in the water-rich
East, and water rights were at the core of this particularly divisive battle.3
Although Virginia Beach is located in the Elizabeth River Basin, the Lake
Gaston pipeline draws water from the Roanoke River Basin, thus reducing
the supply of water available for the people living along the banks of the
Roanoke River. People and societies have long held proprietary feelings
about what they come to view as "their" water, even when long range
population planning may dictate these types of inter-basin water transfers.
This was not simply a battle between the states, but a battle between two
river basins and the people who inhabit them.
A rich cast of characters has populated the legal landscape of this
debate: the Governor of the State of North Carolina, the Roanoke River
Basin Association (a concerned citizens' group) the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and
* Mr. Schmidt received his B.S. in Geology, minor in Oceanography, from Old Dominion
University in 1997, and expects to receive his J.D. in May 2000 from the College of
William and Mary School of Law.
1 See Karen Weintraub, Another Win in Gaston Water Wars, VIRGrNIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), August 23, 1997, at B1.
2 See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir.
1985).
' River basins are simply the lands that surround and drain into a river.
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almost every city in Southside Hampton Roads, Virginia.4 At the center of
the debate has been the legal characterization of the withdrawal of the
water. If the withdrawal is a "discharge" for the purposes of the Clean
Water Act (CWA),5 or an alteration of an existing discharge, it will fall
under section 401 of the CWA.6 Under that section of the CWA, Virginia
Beach must obtain a water quality certification from the State of North
Carolina.
If the withdrawal is not a "discharge," the Clean Water Act is not
implicated, and FERC and the Corps of Engineers could administratively
preclude North Carolina from participating in the entire permitting
process. Once this exclusion is achieved, Virginia Beach could withdraw
the water with impunity.
Another major issue is the standard of review the court has applied
to the decisions made by the various federal agencies involved. The court
initially held in North Carolina v. Hudson, 7 the Lake Gaston case, that the
applicable standard of review was the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.8
Under this standard, the court would uphold the agency action unless it
found that the action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law." 9  The court's decision,
however, did not discuss whether it would review the sufficiency of the
agency's fact-finding, or why it would characterize the agency action as
being more like agency rulemaking than an adjudication.
Part I of this Note discusses the legal and political history of this
complicated story, attempting to illustrate how litigation and political
activism prolonged and complicated the process. Part II examines two
crucial legal issues on which the debate centered-the definition of a
discharge, and the discretion of the Corps and FERC to dispense with an
environmental assessment as part of the approval process. Part III
evaluates the standards of review the court applied, and Part IV speculates
on the future court battles the Lake Gaston pipeline faces. Finally, Part V
will conclude that the court's adoption of an incorrect standard of review
rendered the permitting process highly flawed.
4 The term "Southside Hampton Roads" generally includes the cities of Norfolk, Virginia
Beach, Chesapeake, and Portsmouth, Virginia.
5 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
6 See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
7 665 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
8 See id. at 436.
9 Id.
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I. HISTORY
The Roanoke River runs from its headwaters near Cave Spring,
Virginia, to the Atlantic Ocean via the Albemarle Sound. On its way to
the sound, it drains an approximately 10,000 square-mile basin that sits
across the Virginia-North Carolina state line, as does Lake Gaston itself.'0
Pursuant to licenses obtained from FERC," the Virginia Electric and
Power Company (VEPCO) operates hydroelectric plants along this
waterway at both Lake Gaston and Roanoke Rapids Lake pursuant to
licenses obtained from FERC.
Virginia Beach is located on the lower Chesapeake Bay and is
bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the East. The city is part of a different
river basin, the James River Basin, 13 but Virginia Beach historically had
no independent access to freshwater and was dependent upon a contract
with the City of Norfolk, Virginia, to supply drinking water for its
citizens.1 4 The contract, however, only obligated Norfolk to deliver its
"surplus" water to Virginia Beach. 15 This created obvious problems for
Virginia Beach, which, rather than have its future constrained by the
whims of Norfolk water policy-makers, began focusing as early as 1978
on Lake Gaston as a potential source for drinking water.
On April 27, 1978, North Carolina and Virginia entered into a
formal agreement to hold continuing discussions about the sharing of
mutual water resources. 17 The agreement established the North Carolina-
Virginia Water Resources Management Committee. 18  Virginia Beach
participated in many of the Committee meetings and ultimately proposed
the Lake Gaston pipeline, an 84.5 mile pipeline capable of carrying 60
million gallons per day (mgd) to Virginia Beach, Franklin and
1o See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
1985).
1" See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 436-39.
12 See id. at 439.
13 See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596, 598 (4th Cir. 1991).
'4 See id. at 599.
15 See id.
16 See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
1985).
"7 See id. at 486-87.
18 See id. at 487. The Committee had no binding authority on either state, but was co-
chaired by the North Carolina Secretary of Natural Resources and Community
Development and the Virginia Secretary of Commerce and Resources. See id.
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Chesapeake, all of which are located in Southside Hampton Roads.19 This
pipeline, as proposed, would be constructed entirely within the
Commonwealth of Virginia, at an estimated cost of $176 million.20 Its
construction, city officials hoped, would render Virginia Beach self-
sufficient, freeing the city from its dependence on Norfolk and a handful
of emergency wells that were soon to be reclaimed by the various
municipalities that had leased them to Virginia Beach.2'
On July 15, 1983, after the Committee talks reached a stalemate,
Virginia Beach applied to the Corps of Engineers for a permit to build the
proposed pipeline.22 This action sparked a controversy that was to last for
the next seventeen years and exemplified the intensity of feelings and
rhetoric on both sides of the issue:
Over the next several months, approximately 6,000 people
attended three public hearings in North Carolina and
Virginia where substantial oral and written comments were
presented, expressing both support for and opposition to the
proposed project. On 11 October 1983 the Norfolk District
Corps issued a draft environmental assessment (EA) and a
preliminary finding of no significant impact (FONSI) for
public review and comment. On 7 December 1983 the
Corps issued its final EA and FONSI which concluded that
the project would have no significant environmental
impacts and therefore preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) was not rejuired by the [National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)].
Shortly after the permits were issued, the State of North Carolina and the
Roanoke River Basin Association (RRBA) filed suit against the City of
Virginia Beach, and Virginia Beach counter-sued the RRBA, the State of
North Carolina, and the Governor of North Carolina in his capacity as
Governor, personally serving him with a subpoena to appear in a Virginia
federal courthouse. 24 The federal district court in Norfolk, Virginia, held
19 See id.
20 See id. These discussions took place from 1979 until 1983, but the two sides could not
reach an agreement about the Virginia Beach proposal. See id.
21 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 432 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
22 See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir.
1985). It appears that this unilateral action by Virginia Beach brought the Committee
discussions about the pipeline project to an end. See id.
23 Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 432.
24 See Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d at 486.
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that the Governor of North Carolina was amenable to service of process
under the Virginia Long-Arm Statute25 and that subjecting him to service
of process would not violate the governor's due process rights.26 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, overturned the decision, stating
that "the Governor has not transacted any business in Virginia from which
the city's action arose.",27 Accordingly, the Court transferred the action to
the Eastern District of North Carolina to be consolidated with the North
Carolina action filed in that court.
28
After this initial showing of bad blood, the Virginia and North
Carolina suits were combined. 29  North Carolina alleged that the
construction permits issued by the Corps were invalid because of the
procedure the Corps followed in assessing the impact the pipeline would
have upon the downstream water quality of the Roanoke River. ° North
Carolina also alleged that the procedure, as followed by the Corps, was
"arbitrary and capricious and in violation of NEPA, the Clean Water Act
(CWA), the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), the Water Supply Act of 1958, and the federal regulations
implementing those acts.
25 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1999).
26 See Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d at 487-88.
27 Id. at 488. The court said that Virginia Beach's action did not arise out of any business
transacted by the Governor of North Carolina in the State of Virginia, nor did his
participation in hearings conducted in Virginia give rise to jurisdiction, as the hearings
were held in Virginia for the convenience of the Corps of Engineers, not at the behest of
the Governor. See id. at 488. See also Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779,
785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the District of Columbia long-arm statute did not
confer personal jurisdiction over a party because that party's contacts with the District
were either unrelated to the claim at issue, or protected by that party's First Amendment
right to petition the federal government).
28 See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir.
1985).
29 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 433 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
'0 See id. at 436.3
'Id. at 433. See also National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (declaring a national policy of environmental protection,
requiring Environmental Impact Statements for "all major Federal actions," and
establishing the Council on Environmental Quality); Federal Water Pollution Control
(Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (declaring national
goals of restoration and maintenance of the nation's waters, creating a an effluent
discharge permitting scheme, and establishing states' authority over their waters); Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(prohibiting the obstruction of navigable waters); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (declaring a national policy of preserving,
developing, and restoring the nation's coastlines, and encouraging the states to take the
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In contemplating the appropriate standard of review to apply to the
various claims raised by the parties,32 the court first looked to the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)33 for guidance. 34  Looking at
section 706 of that act, the court determined that the "arbitrary and
~35 36capricious" standard was applicable to this agency action. The court
stated that in reviewing the agency's compliance with NEPA, "the only
role for the court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the
environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.'
37
Deferring to the Corps' findings of fact, the court held that the agency's
decision to issue the FONSI without first conducting an EIS was not an
abuse of the Corps' discretion.
38
The court further held that the water reallocation contract between
the City of Virginia Beach and the Corps of Engineers was a valid
contract, and the Corps of Engineers had the authority to enter into the
contract with Virginia Beach. 39  Nonetheless, the court remanded the
matter back to the Corps with regard to the impact on striped bass, which
are indigenous to the Roanoke River, and required that an independent
assessment be made as to the necessity of the preparation of an EIS to
determine the pipeline's impact on that species. 40  The agency's "hard
look" at the determination that the pipeline would have no impact on the
lead in protecting their own coastlines through non-point source water pollution
mitigation programs and other means); Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. §§ 390b-
390f (1994) (recognizing that it is the primary responsibility of states and local interests
to develop their own water supplies). Additionally, North Carolina was allowed to
amend its complaint to include a challenge to the water storage contract that Virginia
Beach had entered into with FERC. The result of the water storage reallocation contract
would cause water to be stored in the Kerr Reservoir, upstream of Lake Gaston, and
released during the striped bass spawning season to ensure adequate water flow to
maintain optimal conditions for anadromous striped bass egg development. Apparently,
the eggs have a neutral buoyancy, and require sufficient water flow to keep the eggs
afloat until they harden some weeks later. See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 440-41.
32 See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 436.
13 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (1994).
14 See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 436.
35 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402 (1971) (requiring a two
step review process: first looking to whether the agency was acting within the scope of its
authority; and second, determining whether the agency action was "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
36 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 436-37 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
37 Id. at 437 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976)).
38 See id. at 444.
39 See id. at 449.
'0 See id. at 450.
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striped bass was upheld by -the district court,4 1 and the case was appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.4' The issues raised on
appeal were the impact on the striped bass population, the effect on water
quality, and the Corps' alleged failures to adequately explain or consider
environmental factors in issuing the construction permits. 43 The Fourth
Circuit once again reviewed the agency action and, weighing the pressing
water needs of Virginia Beach against what it considered minimal
environmental impacts, upheld the lower court's decision.
44
While the Court of Appeals decision upheld the Corps of
Engineers' construction permit, the project had not yet been approved by
FERC, the licensor of the hydropower facility on Lake Gaston.45 FERC
project 2009 created Lake Gaston; without the dam and resulting
reservoir, no lake would exist from which Virginia Beach could take
water.46 The Roanoke River Basin Association (RRBA) and North
Carolina won an injunction against Virginia Beach on December 10, 1990,
forbidding construction on any part of the pipeline until final FERC
approval had been obtained.47
The court in this case examined two core issues. First, would
FERC be influenced by the amount of money Virginia Beach was
spending on this project, money that would be wasted if FERC denied the
permits? Second, if FERC were to conduct an environmental review of
the project, could the court issue an injunction, pending the completion of
an EIS, and prohibit construction of even the part of the pipeline that
would not be within the project 2009 area?48
The court decided that the construction projects it was being asked
to enjoin were of too minor a nature to exert undue influence on FERC's
decision-making process, and refused to enjoin the construction without
reaching the issue of whether larger projects might be subject to court
intervention.49
The fear of undue influence upon agency decision-making was
first raised in a Maryland-based case where the Maryland Conservation
Council tried to enjoin the construction of a highway that was to cut
4 See generally North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
42 See generally Roanoke River Basin Assoc. v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991).
41 See id. at 62-64.
44 See id. at 66.
45 See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596, 598 (4th Cir. 1991).
46 See id. at 599; City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 995 F.2d
1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1993).
47 See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d at 598.
48 See id. at 598.
49 See id. at 599.
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through Seneca Creek State Park.50 The plaintiffs contended that all
highway construction, whether inside or outside the park, should be
enjoined pending the results of the EIS. 51 The court found that because
major federal action was inevitable, all construction should be enjoined,
lest "[t]he completed segments would 'stand like gun barrels pointing into
the heartland of the park.' 52 The concern was that the public outcry over
a federal agency unilaterally squandering millions of state taxpayers
dollars by denying a construction permit would place the agency under
such extreme political pressure that the permit decision would be made out
of political necessity, rather than concern for the environment.13  The
court's finding that the Lake Gaston pipeline would not "'stand like [a]
gun-barrel' aimed at FERC, 54 seemed to clear the last hurdle for Virginia
Beach to start construction in earnest.
North Carolina had not lost the battle yet. One year later, three of
Virginia's Congressmen charged the federal agencies involved in the
permitting process with collaborating with North Carolina in opposing the
pipeline by reversing their opinion on the original Corps of Engineers
FONSI.55  This dispute between Virginia Beach and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) rapidly found
its way into federal court.
56
To finalize the construction path of the pipeline, Virginia Beach
needed to obtain easements across VEPCO land at Lake Gaston, the FERC
Project 2009 site. 7 Because FERC would have to approve any easements
across the Project 2009 site, and VEPCO knew that FERC was required by
statute to consult the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) prior to
50 See generally Maryland Conservation Council, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039 (4th
Cir. 1986).
51 See id. at 1040-41.
52 Id. at 1042 (citing with approval San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway
Department, 400 U.S. 968, 971 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
53 See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596, 601-02 (4th Cir. 1991).
54 Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
55 See New Misconduct is Charged in Project Plan Reviews, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC.,
June 22, 1992, at 26, available in 1992 WL 2427469. Senators John W. Warner (R) and
Charles S. Robb (D) were joined by Rep. Owen B. Pickett (D), all of Virginia, accused
the Fish and Wildlife Service, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
and other federal agencies of colluding with North Carolina to attack the legitimacy of
the original Corps decision that an EIS was unnecessary. See id. Note that this occurred
soon after the court upheld the construction permits-timing that gave new life to North
Carolina's cause.
56 See generally Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 995 F.2d 1247 (4th
Cir. 1993).
57 See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d at 599.
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granting their approval,58 VEPCO solicited comments from NMFS ahead
of time. 59 Virginia Beach, naturally, had some concerns about an EIS
possibly being required, and it feared that such a requirement would send
Virginia Beach back to square one. Therefore, the municipality voiced
these concerns to the Director of NMFS. 60 NMFS sought an independent
review of the facts, and enlisted the general counsel for NOAA to assist.
6 1
Virginia Beach, now growing very concerned about the fact that only a
few of their questions to NMFS were getting answers, sued NMFS under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)62 for documents detailing the
findings of NMFS' initial fact-finding inquiry.63  The impending
disintegration of the pipeline project prompted Virginia Beach to try
something new: it went to talk with North Carolina about a deal.
Beginning to think that the court battles might never end, Virginia
Beach entered into negotiations with the Governor of North Carolina, and
put together a deal that both sides would find mutually beneficial. The
pipeline would be built, but North Carolina could draw from it as much as
thirty-five million gallons of water per day. Virginia Beach would also
pay for environmental safeguards and widened highways running from the
populous Hampton Roads area to the tourist destinations on North
Carolina's Outer Banks.65 The compromise would take the form of an
interstate com act, and would be voted into law by both state legislatures
and Congress.
This solution seemed ideal. It offered a compromise Virginia
Beach could live with and the certainty that no more environmental
lawsuits would stand between the city and Lake Gaston's water. This
situation, however, was too good to last. The deal had a time limit; the
states' legislatures had until July 1, 1995, to ratify the agreement or it
" See 16 U.S.C. §§ 662(a)-(b), 803(j)(1), 811 (1994).
59 See Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 995 F.2d at 1250.
60 See id. at 1249-50.
61 See id. at 1250.
62 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
63 See Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 995 F.2d 1247, 1251 (4th Cir.
1993).
64 See Bill Geroux, Roanoke River Group Raps Deal, It Says Only Governor Can Reach
Pipeline Deal, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 3, 1995, at B4.
65 See id.
66 See id. at B1. The final deal was reached sometime before May 1, 1995, when a copy
of the agreement was filed with FERC for informational purposes. See With a Settlement
Reached in the Bitter Lake Gaston Dispute, INSIDE FERC, May 8, 1995, available in 1995
WL 8123385 [hereinafter Settlement Reached].
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would expire. 67  While FERC was struggling to assimilate the new
agreement into the EIS it was preparing for the Project 2009 easements in
time to meet the deadline, 68 internal Virginia political squabbles arose that
threatened to scuttle the whole deal.69
Some residents of Southside Hampton Roads, Virginia, were afraid
that with the Virginia Beach pipeline tapping Lake Gaston water, the rural
users of Lake Gaston water might have to comply with new environmental
regulations, which could prove ruinously expensive to small farmers.7 °
The farmers exerted pressure on their state legislators to kill the deal, and
when Republicans and Democrats could not agree upon procedural rules
for the special session that was to enact the interstate compact, the deal fell
71apart once again.
Shortly afterwards, FERC issued the final authorization for the
amendments to VEPCO's license for Project 2009, thus paving the way
for VEPCO to issue the-necessary easements to Virginia Beach for the
pipeline.72 This action sparked off more controversy, because in the
process of completing the EIS, FERC decided that Virginia did not need to
obtain a water quality certification from North Carolina, pursuant to the
CWA.73 The State of North Carolina took exception to being left out of
the decision-making process, and contended that downstream water
quality could be affected, and_.therefore a North Carolina water quality
certification was necessary before the license could issue.74 A lawsuit was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted
a stay to North Carolina, preventing FERC from issuing the final order
approving the project.75 The pipeline project was stalled yet again.
North Carolina then got an additional boost from an unlikely ally,
the City of Norfolk. Norfolk was still Virginia Beach's only supplier of
67 See Geroux, supra note 64, at B4.
68 See Settlement Reached, supra note 66.
69 See Peter Baker, Water Pact Between Va., N.C. Dries Up; Governor, Legislature
Disagree Over Special Session Conditions, WASH. POST, June 28, 1995, at D3.
70 See Peter Baker, Spirits Sink in Virginia Beach as Water Deal Succumbs to State
Politics, WASH. POST, July 5, 1995, at B6.
"' See id.
72 See FERC OKs Plans for Water Project; Federal Court Challenge Anticipated,
ENERGY REP., July 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8063397.
73 See id. FERC decided that N.C. water quality was not an issue because section 401 of
the CWA only applied, in FERC's opinion, if a discharge is made. For a discussion of
this issue, see infra Part II.
74 See FERC Approves Plan to Divert Water from Lake Gaston Hydro Project, INSIDE
FERC, July 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8123714.
71 See id.
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potable water, and it held the contract to treat all of the water from the
Lake Gaston pipeline.76 But now, in the middle of the North Carolina
court battle for water quality certification, Norfolk released a new water
study which showed that existing Norfolk water sources could safely
pump as much as an additional eighteen mgd.7  North Carolina was
already alleging that Virginia Beach was overstating their water needs,
and that Virginia Beach's true needs were only sixteen mgd.78 With this
new study, North Carolina gained valuable ammunition against Virginia
Beach's license from FERC to tap into the Project 2009 water, because the
license was based upon the balancing of the competing water needs of the
region. Now North Carolina had compelling evidence that Virginia Beach
had sufficient resources available to it via Norfolk, and therefore, no
longer needed to take water from the Roanoke River basin.
79
While this issue was causing bitter political bickering between
Norfolk and Virginia Beach,80 the debate caused the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to take another look at the pending lawsuit. The
EPA filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in support of North Carolina's assertion that a North Carolina
water quality certification was required by NEPA. 81 FERC weighed in on
the other side and supported its conclusion that because no discharge
would occur, and the project was wholly in Virginia, no North Carolina
certification was required.82
Because the issue. before the court would now decide whether or
not a state that was downstream of a water project could influence the
permitting of an upstream water project in a neighboring state, a large
number of states' Attorneys General became interested in the lawsuit. By
December 13, 1996, the Attorneys General of forty states had signed their
names to an amicus brief submitted to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
76 See Karen Weintraub, Water Study May Affect Pipeline Battle, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), June 16, 1996, at Al.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See Virginia Beach, Norfolk at Odds Over Water Report: Steady, Everybody,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), June 20, 1996, at A12.
81 See Agency Says N.C. Should Not Be Allowed to Veto Gaston Pipeline, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Nov. 8, 1996, at B5. EPA agreed that section 401 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), gives the state power to
regulate pursuant to a state water quality certification, even without a "discharge" as
generally defined. See id.
82 See id.
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supporting North Carolina.83 Not to be outdone, the United States Justice
Department also filed a brief with the court, stating that North Carolina
could block the pipeline if it could demonstrate that the reduced water
flow would adversely affect downstream water quality.8 4  Both sides
asserted that the Justice Department brief supported their positions.
8 5
The lawsuit was finally argued on February 4, 1997, and decided
on May 9, 1997.86 Over a vigorous dissent, the court held that without a
discharge of a pollutant, or one of the enumerated types of discharges, the
87CWA was not invoked. The result, therefore, was that no certification
was necessary from North Carolina.88 With this final review of FERC's
agency action in granting the permits to VEPCO and Virginia Beach, and
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, the last hurdle was cleared for
Virginia Beach to finalize the construction of the pipeline and begin
pumping water. On August 20, 1997, more than fourteen years after the
first lawsuit was filed, Lake Gaston water was finally flowing to the
residents of Virginia Beach, and the water restrictions the City had been
living with for almost fifteen years were lifted.89
Between the private suits9° and the governmental suits in federal
court, North Carolina was able to delay the Virginia Beach pipeline for
years. This was not the most efficient use of taxpayers' money, and final
83 See Karen Weintraub, 40 States Now Support N.C., The Backing Might Not Sway
Judges, But It Can't Hurt, Say Legal Experts, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR
(Norfolk), Dec. 14, 1996, at BI. See also 26 States Back North Carolina in Its Quest to
Overturn Pipeline Permit, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS 13359, Dec. 16, 1996, [hereinafter 26
States], available in 1996 WL 715884 (describing the briefs argument that FERC
overstepped its regulatory bounds by permitting the pipeline).
84 See Both Sides on Pipeline Fight Applaud Brief GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD
(N.C.), Dec. 25, 1996, at B5.
85 See id.
86 See generally North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 1036 (1998).
87 See id. at 1187.
18 See id.
89 See Karen Weintraub, Another Win in Gaston Water Wars, VIRGNIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Aug. 23, 1997, at BI.
90 By the time the pipeline had reached the operational stage, various environmental
groups and waterfront landowners, alleging damages caused by the pipeline through
depriving them of their riparian rights, or rights to enjoy and use the water that fronted
their property, had filed countless lawsuits. See Karen Weintraub, Beach Scores Another
Legal Win in Fight Over Lake Gaston Water, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR
(Norfolk), Feb. 15, 1997, at B3. Eventually, all of these cases were dismissed, either
because the plaintiffs did not have standing, or because they could not prove damages.
See id. These lawsuits were filed as collateral attacks on the pipeline project, and served
to help delay the proceedings.
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figures for the two states' legal bills have not been forthcoming. As this
chronology attempts to illustrate, the best chance for a lasting resolution-
the doomed interstate compact-was destroyed not by environmental
activists or interstate rhetoric, but by political divisions within Southside
Hampton Roads itself. If the Virginia legislature had exercised strong
political leadership, perhaps the issue could have been satisfactorily
resolved in the summer of 1996.91
II. DISCHARGES AND DISCRETION
A. Discharges
The most divisive issue in the legal controversy surrounding the
pipeline centered on the definition of a "discharge," pursuant to section
401 of the CWA.92 From the beginning it was clear that the legal
significance of this definition would shape the debate. Section 401 of the
CWA requires that any federally-permitted activity that could potentially
result in a discharge into navigable water must seek a state water quality
certification. 93  This allows states to impose their own water quality
standards on federal activities within their borders.
North Carolina urged that section 401 be read expansively to allow
the provisions of the CWA to apply to upstream water projects that could
potentially impact downstream water quality. FERC, however, read
section 401 more narrowly, urging that its application be restricted to
cases where a discharge of pollutants was clearly involved. This reading
would save FERC from having to deal with the different water quality
standards of the fifty states when analyzing permit and licensing decisions.
The history behind this debate has been raging since 1946, when
the Supreme Court handed down the First Iowa decision.94 In First Iowa,
the forerunner of FERC, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), convinced
the Court that the Federal Power Act (FPA)95 preempted all but a few state
proprietary interests. 96  This decision gave the FPC, and later FERC,
91 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997). The author served as law clerk to Judge
Patricia M. Wald, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the lone dissenter in North
Carolina v. FERC.
92 See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
9' See id.
94 First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
9' 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-825(r) (1994).
96 See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 166-67.
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almost unlimited control over federal hydropower permitting and
licensing, with little state interference. 97 All of that changed, however,
when in 1994 the Supreme Court took a dramatically different approach to
another federal hydropower permit in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Department of Ecology (PUD No. 1).98
PUD No. 1 involved a hydropower project on the Dosewallips
River in the State of Washington.99 Washington had adopted a fairly
comprehensive set of water quality standards, and the Dosewallips River
was designated as AA (extraordinary), the highest of Washington's five
classes of water designations.100 The City of Tacoma, and Jefferson
County Public Utility District Number One, wanted to build a
hydroelectric project on the Dosewallips.' 0 l The project was to utilize a
bypass reach 10 2 that would divert some of the river's flow to a generator,
and return the diverted water via a tailrace. °3 Much like the minimum
flow requirements that North Carolina asserted in the Lake Gaston project,
the Washington Department of Ecology determined that the residual water
flow in the river would be insufficient for the steelhead trout and the coho
and chinook salmon that inhabited the Dosewallips River.'
0 4
Unlike the holding in First Iowa, the Court upheld the state's right
to impose its water quality standards on FERC hydropower projects."0 5
Citing section 401 as giving the state the power to require water quality
certification prior to federal action, the court went on to note the EPA's
position that with "401(d), the Congress has given the States the authority
to place any conditions on a water quality certification that are necessary
to assure that the applicant will comply with effluent limitations, water
quality standards ... and with 'any other appropriate requirement of State
law.""' 10 6 Applying its interpretation of Congress' intent, the Court upheld
97 See Liza Devon Herzog, Note, PUD No. / of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (1994). Who Has the (Water) Power Under the
Clean Water Act to Address and Protect State Hydroelectric Interests?, 15 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 101, 102-03 (1996).
98 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
99 See id. at 708.
10 See id. at 705.
10" See id. at 708-09.
'02 See id. at 709.
103 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
709 (1994). A "tailrace" is a race for conveying water away from a point of industrial
application (as a waterwheel or turbine). See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2329 (3d ed. 1961).114 See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 709
o' See id. at 700.
106 Id. (quoting EPA, WETLANDS AND 401 CERTIFICATION 23 (1989)).
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the "EPA's conclusion that activities-not merely discharges-must
comply with state water quality standards is a reasonable interpretation of
§401, and is entitled to deference."' 10 7
The CWA requires the states to promulgate a comprehensive set of
water quality standards.'0 8 The standards must designate the usage of the
waterway, the criteria by which the waterways will be protected, and an
antidegradation policy.1° 9 It was in this antidegradation policy that the
court found Washington's best reason for asserting its water quality
standards for the hydropower project." 0
The Washington Department of Ecology contended, and the
Supreme Court agreed, that the implementation of the "antidegradation
policy in a manner 'consistent' with existing uses of the stream" required a
state water quality certification to ensure that the diversion of water would
not reduce the stream flow to levels that would degrade the fisheries and
recreational use of the Dosewallips River."' This is exactly the type of
argument that North Carolina and the RRBA were making in the Lake
Gaston battle-that the decreased stream flow could have adverse effects
on the downstream fisheries, and that it was an abuse of the Corps of
Engineers' discretion to discount those concerns without an EIS." 2
This approach to section 401 would seem to require that all federal
projects that utilize or affect navigable waters seek state certification."13
107 Id. at 712. Note that the court granted deference to the EPA per Chevron US.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because the EPA is the
federal agency tasked with administering the CWA.
108 See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313
(1994).
109 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4) (1994); 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.2, 131.6(a), 131.10 (1998). The
anti-degradation policy was created by a 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act, see
Water Quality Act of 1987 § 404(b), Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
1313(d)(4)), to ensure that no stretch of navigable water would be allowed to degenerate
below current conditions. Under this policy, Congress announced that water quality
could only be maintained or improved upon. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4).
10 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
718-19 (1994).
... Id. at 719.
112 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 438 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
113 See Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens: PUD No. / of Jefferson County
v. Washington Department of Ecology, 25 ENVTL. L. 255, 260-61 (1995); Herzog, supra
note 96, at 107; Alia S. Miles, Comment, Searching for the Definition of "Discharge":
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 28 ENVTL. L. 191, 192 (1998). See generally Lynda
L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the
Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv. 95 (1995)
(discussing private landowner rights against water consumption by upstream riparians,
whose suits were dismissed in Virginia state court, and discounted in federal court).
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This was certainly the EPA's stand in PUD No. 1. The Court specifically
noted that a change in water quantity could easily be seen as a change in
water quality, as so many water quality factors were quantity-dependent or
-driven. 114 But, when North Carolina attempted to utilize this logic to
compel Virginia to seek a state certification from North Carolina, the EPA
declined to interpret this change in water quantity as implicating any
downstream anti-degradation policy North Carolina might have. 11
5
B. Discretion and Deference
Discretion is closely linked to the concept of deference. Discretion
is the amount of self-determination that an agency has, or the extent to
which an official's actions "cannot be reviewed and reversed by any other
official."' 6 Deference is the corresponding amount of freedom a court
will give agency action before engaging in judicial review or fact-finding.
Judge Friendly approached the concept this way: "[T]he trial judge has
discretion in those cases where his ruling will not be reversed simply
because an appellate court disagrees."'" 7 These concepts are important
because the court in Hudson I upheld the Corps' decision that no EIS was
necessary, and that the Corps' action was not arbitrary and capricious,
based on the premise that the agency was acting within its discretion.' ' 8
The debate over the role discretion plays in reviewing executive
agency action takes a more important position when viewed in the light of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron.119 In that case, the Court laid
out a two-part test for statutory interpretation. "First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."'' 20
Second, if Congress has not spoken directly to the issue, the
reviewing court is to examine the agency's interpretation to see if it is a
114 See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 719-20.
115 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
1998 U.S. LEXIS 882.
116 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (1977).
117 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754 (1982).
118 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 437 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
119 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
120 Id. at 842-43.
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permissible interpretation of the statute. 121 Courts have applied different
criteria when analyzing the second step of Chevron.
The biggest battle in the unresolved war over Chevron
ambiguity involves statutory interpretation ....
Intentionalism, as they call it, "refers to the use of a variety
of tools, including legislative purpose and legislative
history, in an effort to determine the intent of the legislature
when it included a particular word or phrase in a statute."
Textualism, on the other hand, "refers to the use of a
different set of tools, including dictionary definitions, rules
of grammar, and canons of construction, in an effort to
derive the putatively objective meaning of the statutory
word or phrase."'
122
The D.C. Circuit court utilized the textualist approach to statutory
interpretation, and after performing the "Chevron two-step,"' 23 came to
the conclusion that absent a discharge of pollutants, section 401 of the
CWA did not apply.' 24  It mechanically applied the definition of a
"discharge" to the facts and decided that no discharge had occurred;
therefore, the statute did not apply. 25 North Carolina, on the other hand,
argued the intentionalist viewpoint that the intention of the CWA could
not be to remove downstream neighbors from the decision-making
process, and argued that the withdrawal of water would result in an
"altered discharge" that would invoke the statute.' 26
It can be seen that intentionalism can be used to expand statutory
scope and can allow judicial interpretation of statutory schemes to be very
broad if the court so chooses.127 Textualism, with its literal approach to a
statute's wording, would appear to lead to a narrowing of the court's
review, reducing the amount of judicial creativity that could be
11 See id. at 843.
112 Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Current Trends in Judicial Review of Environmental
Agency Action, 27 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1997) (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995)).
123 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
available in 1998 U.S. LEXIS 882.
124 See id.
1
2
1 See id. at 1187-88.
12 6 See id. at 1188.
127 See O'Scannlain, supra note 122, at 6-7.
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summoned, by tying the court to using conventional definitions.128 The
D.C. Circuit, for example, quoted Webster's International Dictionary to
support its interpretation of the statute.' 
29
Nonetheless, some commentators contend that textualism leads to
greater agency deference as legislative history becomes largely ignored by
the courts. 30 As this argument goes, certain members of the Court will
merely look to see if a statute is ambiguous. If it can be found to contain
ambiguity, the Justices will defer to the agency's interpretation, unless it is
clearly erroneous. 131 This may be exactly what the D.C. Circuit Court did
in the Lake Gaston case-deferring to FERC's interpretation of the FPA.
To see if the D.C. Circuit court decided the Lake Gaston issue
correctly, it must be analyzed in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
PUD No. 1, arguably the single most important case in resolving section
401 disputes. PUD No. 1 expanded the doctrine of statutory
interpretation, in regard to section 401, beyond textualist boundaries.' 32
The Court looked to the intent of the regulatory scheme, therefore,
embracing the intentionalist view. 133 Consequently, it was no surprise that
Justice Scalia, the advocate of textualism, dissented from PUD No. 1.134
C. Analysis
While the Court took an intentionalist approach in PUD No. 1, the
agencies resisted the consequent loss of discretion. As the Court expands
the judicial interpretation role, agency discretion necessarily suffers.
More judicial interference intrudes on the power of the executive agency,
because the court is limiting the amount of deference it will give agency
128 See id.
129 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63 (3d. ed. 1961) for its definition of the
Word "alter").
130 See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REv. 393, 401 (1996) (citing Justice Scalia's
interpretation of the Chevron doctrine as protective of agencies' discretion in interpreting
broad legislation).
"' See id. at 402-03.
132 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
712 (1994).
133 See id.
'14 See id. at 724. Justice Thomas argued in a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, an
outspoken textualist, that "the text and structure of section 401 indicate that a State may
impose ... only those conditions that are related to discharges." Id. at 728 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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action. 135  This curtailing of agency autonomy is why FERC took a
textualist view of section 401 in both PUD No. 1 and the Lake Gaston
dispute.' 36
This is what FERC argued in all of the preceding lawsuits, and
indeed, is the basic argument it espoused in First Iowa.137 The FERC
argument is that Congress intended to centralize all the permitting and
decision-making involved in hydropower projects into one agency.1
Important natural resource management would be needlessly complicated
and politicized if all the affected states could require that their state
agencies impose restrictions on these types of projects.
The Court said in Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas,
139
however, that PUD No. 1 stood for the principle that in order for Chevron-
style deference to apply to agency action, the agency must have
congressional delegation of administrative authority, and only the
particular agency entrusted to administer the statute is entitled to
deference. 14 This became important because FERC argued that it should
be given deference, and the court agreed. 14  This is interesting because
under ONDA and PUD No. 1, only the agency tasked with administering
the CWA should have been granted deference, and that agency is the
EPA. 14
2
In the Lake Gaston case, the EPA had changed its position, from
originally agreeing with FERC's position that section 401 of the CWA did
not apply, to agreeing with North Carolina that it did apply.
143
Accordingly, the EPA asserted that under their new reading of the CWA
section 401(d), a North Carolina water quality certification was required
prior to federal action.1 44 This meant that the EPA had taken the position
135 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 521.
136 See Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and
Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 50 (1995).
137 See PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
721-22 (1994).
'
38 See id. at 722.
"39 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1540-41 (D. Or. 1996).
14o See id. at 1540-41; Dana G. Leonard, PUD 1, Thomas, and the Future of Section 401
of the Clean Water Act: An Expansion of State Regulation, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 293, 305-06 (1998).
141 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
142 See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 4.38(a)(1) (1998) (noting that the EPA has the power to
administer the CWA).
143 See Agency Says N.C. Should Not Be Allowed to Veto Gaston Pipeline, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Nov. 8, 1996, at B5.
144 See id.
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that the issuing of permits and easements to the City of Virginia Beach
should have been conditioned upon receiving the certification from North
Carolina, or North Carolina waiving the certification requirement. 1
45
FERC should have listened to and respected the EPA's position
regarding the North Carolina water quality certification, because the
federal regulations that govern FERC's power to issue permits under the
FPA require FERC to "consult" with the EPA. 146 Indeed, that section of
the Code specifically states that section 401 of the CWA requires not only
federal agency consultations, but also water quality certification from the
state. 147
Because the EPA has been tasked by the Congress to use its special
expertise to oversee this important federal program, the EPA's expertise
should have been respected in this case. At a minimum, because of the
agency's administration of the CWA, the EPA's interpretation of section
401 of the CWA should have been respected by FERC.141
The decision in PUD No. 1 dictates that only the EPA's
interpretation of the CWA, and not FERC's or the Corps of Engineers'
interpretation, is entitled to deference by the reviewing court under the
Chevron doctrine. 149  Because the EPA said that the Virginia Beach
pipeline needed a North Carolina water quality certification, the court
should have given deference to that position. 50 Using the intentionalist
approach, such as in Chevron, ONDA, and PUD No. 1, if a court uses the
broad interpretation of the word "discharge," and finds that the statute
contains ambiguity, it would then be compelled to use the second prong of
Chevron. Under that test, it would appear that the EPA's interpretation of
section 401 is a reasonable reading of subsection (d), and therefore,
entitled to deference. 15
145 See 26 States, supra note 83.
146 See 18 C.F.R. § 4.38(a)(1) (1998) ("Before it files any application for . . . an
exemption from licensing ... a potential applicant must consult with the relevant Federal,
State, and interstate resource agencies, including . . . the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ... ").
147 See id. "[T]he appropriate State water resource management agencies" would be the
State regulatory agency that is tasked with either water resource management or
environmental quality. Id.
141 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
("Considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.").
149 See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1540-41 (D. Or.
1996).0 See id.
151 See Leonard, supra note 140, at 293.
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Having established that under an intentionalist view, a broad
reading of "discharge" is allowed, and that the EPA interpretation of
section 401 requires North Carolina approval, the question is whether the
textualist view would also lead to a victory for North Carolina.
52
Initially, the textualist approach would seem to indicate what the Lake
Gaston court said, that the "plain language" meaning of "discharge" would
require an addition of some physical component to the water downstream
of the Lake Gaston pipeline.' 53  As water is being removed, no
"discharge" takes place, and without that threshold event, section 401 is
not invoked. 154 Because section 401 is not invoked, no North Carolina
certification is needed, and the pipeline project wins.1 55
The D.C. Circuit found two major differences between this case
and PUD No. 1: the magnitude of the water withdrawal, and the water
reallocation contract into which the Corps of Engineers and Virginia
Beach had entered.' 56 Additionally, both sides of the Lake Gaston suit
stipulated that no conventional discharge would result from the operation
of the pipeline, only an "altered discharge." 157 There does not seem to be
any dispute that the amount of water the pipeline will withdraw from Lake
Gaston will represent a reduction of approximately one percent of
downstream water flow quantity.' 58 Compare that reduction to PUD No.
1, where the amount of water diverted from the Dosewallips River was
approximately seventy-five percent of the stream flow. 59 Also, the water
quality standard articulated in PUD No. 1 dealt not only with the quantity
of water flow, but a mix of other factors such as aesthetic beauty,
biodiversity, water clarity and purity, and the assurance that all
recreational activity currently enjoyable on the river would continue
without degradation.160 It is much easier to note a deterioration of the
types of recreation that can be enjoyed on a river, and the reduction of
aesthetic beauty, if seventy-five percent of the river is being diverted, than
if only one percent is eliminated.
152 See O'Scannlain, supra note 122, at 1.
153 North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
154 See id. at 1188.
'
55 See id. at 1189.
15 6 See id. at 1186.
57 Id. at 1186-87. See also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 709 (1994) (describing an altered discharge scenario-
installation of a dam, which, although it significantly alters the character of the waterway,
adds nothing new to the water, only diminishes the waterway's rate of flow).
158 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1182-89 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
159 See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 709.
160 See id. at 706 n. 1.
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Also, in PUD No. 1, the hydropower project did not have any
mechanism like the water reallocation contract that Virginia Beach had
procured from Lake Kerr.' 61  This type of contract ensures that an
adequate water flow will be available during critical fish spawning
seasons.162 The project in PUD No. I did not have a contract of this type,
and during the spawning season of the salmon, an inadequate amount of
water flow might develop, thus harming the salmon hatcheries. 163
Given the significant differences between the Lake Gaston pipeline
and the PUD No. 1 hydropower project, it should not be surprising that the
court distinguished the holding in PUD No. 1. Nonetheless, the court in
Lake Gaston was not required to accept FERC's interpretation of section
401, because some case law existed to the effect that the word "discharge"
could be read broadly. 164  Also, under the Chevron test, EPA's
interpretation of section 401, not FERC's, was entitled to judicial
deference.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The other major legal issue in the Lake Gaston pipeline
controversy dealt with the standards of review that the North Carolina
district court applied to the actions of the Corps of Engineers and
FERC. 165 The court applied the "arbitrary and capricious" test and the
"hard look" test to the Corps of Engineers' and FERC's permitting
procedures in the 1987 case.1 66  The court looked to the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for guidance in reviewing the
construction permit dispute in 1987.167 Specifically, the court asserted its
power to "set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be..
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law."' 168
The court took its cues from two cases that discussed this most
deferential of review standards, Overton Park169 and Kleppe.170  While
161 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
162 See id.
163 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
709 (1994).
'64 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d at 1199.
165 North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 436-37.
166 See id. at 440, 443.
167 See id. at 436.
168 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)).
169 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415-16 (1971).
[Vol. 23:893
UN-NEIGHBORLY CONDUCT
these cases do indeed lay out the type of review the court should conduct
in accordance with section 706(2)(A) of the APA, that standard of review
is most commonly used by courts when reviewing agency rule-making
procedures. 17 1 Indeed, the court discussed the case as if reviewing an
agency rule, quoted cases that review agency rule making processes, and
used the terminology of reviewing an agency decision.1
72
This was not a case about agency rule-making, but about agency
permitting and licensing procedures.' 3 This is an important distinction to
make when reading the definitions that are used in the APA. The APA
speaks of two types of agency processes: rulemaking 174 and adjudication.
An "adjudication" is specifically defined as the process of creating an
agency order.175 An "order" is the APA's terminology for a license.1
76
The plain language used in the APA when discussing licensing procedures
leads to the conclusion that the agency was not making a rule when it
issued a permit. Section § 551(8) of the APA says that a 'license' includes
"the whole or part of an agency permit, certificate, approval,... or other
form of permission."
177
From this definition, the plain language of the statute would imply
that when FERC was expediting the construction permits by foregoing the
The court must consider, first, whether the agency acted within the
scope of its authority and, second, whether the actual choice made by
the agency was arbitrary, capricious an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. To make this finding the court
must consider ... whether there was a clear error of judgment. This
standard of review is highly deferential and the agency decision is
"entitled to a presumption of regularity."
North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 437 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (quoting Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 415).
170 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) ("[T]he only role for a court is to
insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences; it cannot
'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken."').
17' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) applies to those situations not controlled by § 706(2)(E), which
controls agency action conducted subject to §§ 556 and 557. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
172 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 436-37.
'
73 See id. at 431.
174 "'[R]ule making' means agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1994).
171 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(7).
176 "'[O]rder' means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule
making but including licensing." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (emphasis added).
177 5 U.S.C. § 551(8).
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EIS, and issuing the initial FONSI, it was involved in "licensing," as that
term is defined in the APA, and therefore, issuing an agency "order." 178
Because FERC was issuing an "order," FERC was necessarily involved in
an "adjudication."
Having established that FERC's permitting and licensing of the
pipeline construction was an adjudication, the disputes that RRBA and
North Carolina raised about the necessity of an EIS, the effect of the
pipeline on the striped bass, and the validity of the Corps FONSI should
have been conducted according to the section of the APA dealing with
adjudications. 179 Under the APA, adjudications are not conducted like
"notice and comment" rulemaking.180 Adjudications are formal, trial-like
proceedings,18 ' conducted on a formal record. 182  These types of
proceedings would have compelled the Corps of Engineers and FERC to
produce evidence in an adversarial process and to have their experts cross-
examined by the other parties to the dispute. 1
83
In addition to giving the parties different rights and responsibilities
at a formal hearing, the invocation of the adjudication sections of the
APA 184 gives rise to a different standard of review.1 85 The standard of
review to be applied in reviewing an agency adjudication is the
"unsupported by substantial evidence" standard.186 "Substantial evidence"
review is significantly different than "arbitrary and capricious" review, or
"hard look" review. 187
"Substantial evidence" review is a higher standard of review than
"arbitrary and capricious" review and requires that the reviewing court
weigh the evidence that the agency considered in making its decision.' 88
The reviewing court will ensure that the agency based its decision on
178 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 432-33 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
179 See 5 U.S.C. § 554.
80 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (requiring that an agency make public announcements
regarding its actions, allow time for public comments, and that the agency address those
comments) with 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994) (requiring a formal proceeding whereby the
agency must defend itself in an adversarial setting).
.8. See id. §§ 556-557.
182 See id. § 554.
183 See id. § 556(d) ("A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.").
184 See id. §§ 554, 556, 557.
185 See id. § 706(E)-(F).
186 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(E)-(F) (1994).
117 See Roy A. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action, Remarks Before the
D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference (March 18, 1974), in 34 FED. B.J. 54, 59 (1975).
88" See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-78 (1951).
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"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support the conclusion. ' ' i 9 As the court held in Consolidated Edison,
"substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla."' 90
For example, compare the substantial evidence review, as discussed
above, with the D.C. Circuit's definition of "hard look" review in Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC.191 "Hard look" review entails the court
looking for "danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard
look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned
decision-making."' 192 The role of the court is to ensure that the agency has
taken a "hard look" at the issues, not that the court should take a "hard
look."''
93
The various standards of review have been referred to as "mood
points" that the court should start from when analyzing agency actions. 94
[T]he standards may be seen as expressing the "mood point"
or the critical attitude with which the court should approach
the agency .... In terms of attitude, the reasonableness and
arbitrariness standards point judicial review in emotionally
opposite directions. The reasonableness standard requires the
court to reach the positive conclusion that the agency's
decision is reasonable before it may accept that decision. The
arbitrariness standard requires only that the court reach the
negative conclusion that the agency's decision is not arbitrary
in order to accept that decision. Thus, in order to uphold the
agency under the reasonableness standard, the court must to
some extent approve of the agency's determination, even if it
does not reach the point of agreement. But, in order to uphold
the agency under the arbitrariness standard, the court need
only reach the point at which it can conclude the agency's
decision is not intolerable.
195
In this scenario, the court should not have looked to unreasonable action
by the Corps of Engineers as it would when analyzing agency action under
189 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 217 (1938).
190 Id.
19 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
92 Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).
193 See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.5, at 39 (2d
ed. 1997).
194 Schotland, supra note 187, at 59.
195 KOCH, supra note 193, § 10.1, at 14-15.
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the arbitrary and capricious test. Rather, the court should have looked to
whether the Corps of Engineers' decision not to conduct an EIS was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.' 96
In the Lake Gaston permit case, North Carolina and the RRBA
both presented evidence and arguments that downstream water quality
would be affected. 197 The court, having applied the most deferential of
review tests, found that the Corps of Engineers' actions were not arbitrary
or capricious. 198 If a "substantial evidence" test were applied, however,
the Corps might have had to rebut the proof tendered by the state and
RRBA in an administrative hearing. Applying this standard, the court
would likely have found the agency action unreasonable in the face of
evidence to the contrary, and should have either demanded more agency
fact-finding, or that an EIS be conducted. The timing is important,
because if in 1987 the court had refused to uphold the construction
permits, there might not have been subsequent lawsuits over the EIS and
the FERC license amendments.
Furthermore, in an agency adjudication hearing, the burden of
proof is upon the applicant, or the proponent of the order. 99  The
proponents in this case were FERC, the Corps of Engineers, and the City
of Virginia Beach.200 A formal adjudication would have forced Virginia
Beach to prove, by substantial evidence, that no adverse effects would be
felt downstream. Proof of no effects, when part of a formal record, would
probably have prevented some of the litigation that was to follow.
Because the court used an inappropriate standard of review, the
agency's action was insufficiently scrutinized. By applying the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of review instead of the "substantial evidence"
standard, the burden of proof was put on the wrong party, and the party in
the best position to discover the effects of the pipeline was relieved of that
responsibility. The court should have held FERC, the Corps of Engineers,
and Virginia Beach to a higher standard of proof at the critical permitting
stage, and North Carolina and the RRBA should have prevailed in
preventing the pipeline from being built without a full-blown EIS.
196 See id.
197 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 438 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
"9 See id. at 440.
'99 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent
of a rule or order has the burden of proof.").
200 See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 431 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("This action
seeks judicial review of two decisions of the United States Army Corps of Engineers: (1)
to issue a permit to the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia .... ").
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IV. THE FUTURE OF LAKE GASTON
Now that the Lake Gaston pipeline has been completed,2"' has
withstood judicial review,202 and is in operation, 203 water restrictions have
been lifted.20 4 Now that the pipeline battle is over, North Carolina says
that the fight over the permit renewals for VEPCO Project 2009 is just
beginning. 205 The VEPCO hydroelectric project that created Lake Gaston
is acknowledged to create a discharge, and therefore section 401 of the
CWA definitely applies to Project 2009.206
Unfortunately for Virginia Beach, VEPCO's license to operate the
plant on Lake Gaston expires in 2001.207 At that time, VEPCO must apply
208to FERC to renew the license. Because section 401 will apply to the
Project 2009 license as a whole, rather than a small amendment, a North
Carolina water quality certification will be required before FERC can
renew VEPCO's license. 209 North Carolina has vowed never to allow
VEPCO's permit to operate the Lake Gaston hydropower plant to be
renewed as long as the pipeline is in operation. 2  Now that the permitting
power is in North Carolina's hands, another legal battle looms.
V. CONCLUSION
The Lake Gaston permitting procedure was flawed in two major
respects. First, the court interpreted the case law dealing with section 401
incorrectly. Second, the court applied the wrong standard of review to the
201 See Karen Weintraub, Splash! Gaston Water Rushes In. The Flow Follows 15 Years,
76 Miles and Plenty of Legal Red Tape, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk),
Aug. 21, 1997, at A1.
202 See Karen Weintraub, Another Win in Gaston Water Wars, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Aug. 23, 1997, at B1. See generally North Carolina v. FERC,
112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998).
203 See John Murphy, Quenching the Thirst for Growth 76-Mile Water Lifeline Becomes a
Reality at Last. New Water Systems and Partnerships will help area Nurture
Development, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Nov. 7, 1997, at B 1.
204 See John Murphy, Beach Lifts Restrictions on Water. Most Hookups Are Still on
Hold Until System Reaches Full Capacity, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk),
Nov. 19, 1997, at B1.
205 See Weintraub, supra note 202, at B 1.
206 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d at 1186.
207 See Karen Weintraub, Court Refusal Ends Gaston Battle Power Permit Fight Just
Now Starting, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Feb. 24, 1998, at B1.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See id.
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major federal action of granting the construction permits to Virginia
Beach. In the interpretation of section 401 of the CWA, the court should
have followed the holding of Chevron, and only granted deference to the
EPA's interpretation of the certification requirements of section 401.
More importantly, the court should not have granted deference to FERC's
and the Corps of Engineers' interpretation of the CWA. This lack of
deference would have resulted in those agencies being held to a higher
level of judicial review. Both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals should have adopted the broader
"intentionalist" doctrine of construing the "discharge" threshold
requirement of the CWA espoused by the EPA, rather than the "textualist"
approach that was used in the courts' holdings. This would have the result
of invoking the section of the CWA that requires a water quality
certification from the State of North Carolina. Additionally, this type of
interpretation would be closer to the Supreme Court's interpretation of that
section of the CWA, as espoused in PUD No. 1 and ONDA, rather than
reverting back to the First Iowa approach that seems to have been
superceded.
The court should also have viewed the initial license and
permitting procedures as an "adjudication" under the APA, rather than as
an agency rule making procedure. Under an adjudication review, the court
would then have applied the "substantial evidence" standard of review, as
opposed to the "arbitrary and capricious" review that was applied. A
substantial evidence review would have required the court to scrutinize
more closely the agency record and the reasonableness of the agency
decision not to conduct an EIS prior to allowing construction to begin,
rather than deciding that the agency had not acted unreasonably.
If the Fourth Circuit had applied the proper levels of review and
deference, North Carolina would have been allowed to require a state
water quality certification prior to the pipeline being constructed. If this
had happened, the pipeline might never have been built. More likely,
North Carolina and Virginia would have been forced to the negotiating
table instead of the courtroom, and a mutually-agreeable settlement might
have been reached. This outcome would have brought finality to the Lake
Gaston controversy rather than the extended skirmishing expected over the
renewal of the project 2009 permit. Once again, Virginia will need to
address the issue of downstream water quality certification from North
Carolina, but this time North Carolina holds all the cards.
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